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The decision of whether or not to vaccinate is a complex one. It involves the contribution both to a social
good—herd immunity—and to one’s own well being. It is informed by social influence, personal experience,
education, and mass media. In our work, we investigate a situation in which individuals make their choice
based on how social neighbourhood responded to previous epidemics. We do this by proposing a minimal-
istic model using components from game theory, network theory and the modelling of epidemic spreading,
and opinion dynamics. Individuals can use the information about the neighbourhood in two ways—either
they follow the majority or the best-performing neighbour. Furthermore, we let individuals learn which of
these two decision-making strategies to follow from their experience. Our results show that the flexibility
of individuals to chose how to integrate information from the neighbourhood increases the vaccine uptake
and decreases the epidemic severity if the following conditions are fulfilled. First, the initial fraction of in-
dividuals who imitate the neighbourhood majority should be limited, and second, the memory of previous
outbreaks should be sufficiently long. These results have implications for the acceptance of novel vaccines
and raising awareness about vaccination, while also pointing to promising future research directions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The development of vaccines is one of the greatest
achievements of modern medicine. They save millions
of lives yearly, not only by giving immunity to people ex-
posed to an infection but also by stopping disease out-
breaks. Most famously, perhaps, vaccine drove the eradi-
cation of smallpox.[1] At the time of writing, vaccines are the
main hope for a pharmaceutical solution to the COVID-19
crisis.[2–4]
To be able to evaluate interventions involving vaccina-
tion, we need to model the selection of who gets vac-
cinated and how that affects epidemics.[5] Creating such
models is a very challenging task to which this paper seeks
to contribute.[6, 7] The main difficulty lies in the complex
feedback mechanisms between the epidemics itself and the
decision to get vaccinated.[8–10] Not only are there irra-
tional anti-vaccination sentiments that themselves spread
through social contagion,[11, 12] but sometimes not getting
vaccinated is a perfectly rational choice.
When the population level of immunity is high enough,
an outbreak will die out by itself. If this is the case, the pop-
ulation is said to have herd immunity. Even if the vaccine is
effective, the marginal benefit of getting vaccinated in a so-
ciety with herd immunity is small.[13] On top of this, a vac-
cine could be costly, inefficient, laden with side-effects, or
inconvenient to administer.[14] For an individual, the reality
is often between these extremes and not a choice between a
cheap lifesaver or a costly unnecessity. Thus, this choice is
known in the literature as the vaccination dilemma.[15, 16]
Assume the vaccine is effective but has some side-effects
(although much milder than the disease itself). Then one
can model the rational-choice aspect of vaccination within
the framework of game theory.[7, 17] As often is the case,
behavioural and economic game theorists both take an
interest in this problem, with somewhat different start-
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ing points. The behavioural game-theory line of research
typically focuses on herd immunity as a public good—
something valuable and accessible without competition to
anyone in society.[9, 10] Like other public goods, herd immu-
nity is prone to free-riding people who undermine the good
by avoiding vaccination.[18] Economic game theorists in-
stead think of vaccination as a decision based on an individ-
ual’s costs and benefits, and regard herd immunity as a pos-
itive externality. The truth lies in between these pictures.[8]
Benefiting a public good is not the most common driving
force behind an individual’s vaccination decisions.[19, 20] It
would also make little sense to get vaccinated to contribute
to herd immunity if very few others were vaccinated, which
is precisely when the private benefits are the largest.[13] On
the other hand, herd immunity and, ultimately, eradication
of a disease are the primary goals at a national level,[3, 4] and
thus more than a mere externality.
There is a growing research interest in game-theoretic
studies of vaccination.[6, 17] For articles in the economic
game-theory literature, see e.g. Geoffard and Philipson[8] or
Francis[13] and further references therein. In the evolution-
ary game-theory literature, early works coupled game the-
ory and epidemic dynamics by differential-equation based
models.[21] Later, authors recognised that social interaction
structures are better modelled by networks. For example,
in Fu et al.[15] individuals compare their fitness to randomly
selected network neighbours to determine whether or not
to imitate the neighbour. The phrases “fitness” and “payoff”
(that in this paper are synonymous) come from the game-
theory literature and capture the ability to avoid infection
minus the cost associated with the vaccination. Other au-
thors have extended the use of imitation dynamics. Zhang
et al.[22], for example, considered the possibility that deci-
sions are neighbour-dependent by defining an individual’s
fitness depending on their entire neighbourhood. Zhang et
al.[23] and Han et al.[24] studied individuals with memory,
calculating an individual’s fitness as the weighted average
of the past payoffs. Moreover, models by Xia et al.,[25] Ichi-
nose and Kurisaku,[26] and Iwamura and Tanimoto[27] dis-
regarded payoffs altogether in certain situations by allow-
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FIG. 1. Time evolution of a sim-
ulation run. We show the out-
break size ((a) and (b)) and the frac-
tion of conformists ((c) and (d)) for
a short m = 2 ((a) and (c)) and a
long m = 8 ((b) and (d)) memory
length. The plots also show two
initial fractions of conformists, c =
0.5 (blue curves) and c = 0.9 (yel-
low curves). The population seems
unable (respectively, able) to even-
tually reduce the outbreak size irre-
spective of the memory length when
the initial fraction of conformists is
high (moderate). Short (long) mem-
ory seems insufficient (sufficient) to
trigger a substantial interchange of
imitation mechanisms among in-
dividuals compared to the initial
state. Long memory thus helps to
eliminate outbreaks when the initial
fraction of conformists is moderate
(blue curve in panel (b)). Here, the
infection rate is relatively large, β =
2. The networks are constructed by
the Erdo˝s–Rényi model with N = 64
nodes and the average degree k = 2,
which ensures the existence of a gi-
ant component (that essentially all
nodes belong to). Time is measured
in the number of vaccination cycles.
ing individuals to follow the neighbourhood majority with a
non-zero probability, or, otherwise, use fitness comparison
to decide their action.
Our study extends the above models by unifying two
ideas. First, when making a vaccination decision based
on the performance of their neighbours, individuals can
follow different decision rules. Second, an individual can
learn by experience and thus change its decision rules as
time goes on. We use two empirically observed decision
rules. First, individuals can follow the best performer in
the extended neighbourhood (the neighbourhood of a fo-
cal node and the node itself).[28, 29] We call such individuals
performists. Second, they can also follow the majority in the
extended neighbourhood.[28] We will refer to individuals fol-
lowing this strategy as conformists. Furthermore, we will let
the individuals chose between these two rationales based
on experience. The duration of the individuals’ memory is
one of the model-parameters we explore. In the remain-
der of this article, we will go over the technical details of
our model, present our simulation results, and discuss the
broader implications of our findings.
II. MODELDESCRIPTION
We construct a network-based epidemiological model
with vaccination. The model comprises individuals embed-
ded in a social network through which epidemics spread.
Probably the closest scenario is that of seasonal influenza.
Occasionally, the population has the opportunity of getting
vaccinated. Then individuals evaluate the performance of
their social surroundings, and, based on this information,
decide about their vaccination. They have two ways (imita-
tion mechanisms) of performing this evaluation—the men-
tioned conformist and performist strategies. The individu-
als then update these imitation mechanisms based on ex-
perience.
Each cycle of epidemic outbreaks and vaccinations plays
out in three stages. First, individuals choose whether or not
to vaccinate following their current strategy and available
information. Second, we calculate the expectation value of
the outbreak size for the particular configuration of vacci-
nated nodes. This is done by averaging over 640 runs of
the Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) simulation (dis-
cussed further below). Finally, individuals choose between
the conformist or performist imitation strategy. We simu-
late these vaccination cycles over 150 times to reach a steady
state.
At the beginning of every simulation, we randomly vac-
cinate 10 % of the population and let a fraction c be con-
formists (otherwise performists). From the second vaccina-
tion, all individuals make decisions following their strate-
gies. We allow the choice of strategy to depend on the expe-
rience gathered through vaccination. We assume that indi-
viduals choose the imitation mechanism that gives them a
larger average payoff over the period of m preceding vacci-
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FIG. 2. Time evolution of typical
runs. We show the outbreak size
((a) and (b)) and the fraction of con-
formists ((c) and (d)) for a short m =
2 ((a) and (c)) and a long m = 8 ((b)
and (d)) memory length, and for two
initial fractions of conformists, c =
0.5 (blue curves) and c = 0.9 (yellow
curves). Solid curves represent en-
semble averages, whereas error bars
show standard deviations. The pa-
rameter values are the same as in
Fig. 1. Time is measured in the num-
ber of vaccination cycles.
FIG. 3. Low initial conformism is good, moderate initial con-
formism is best, and high initial conformism is bad. We show
the outbreak size, averaged over the last 50 vaccination cycles, as
a function of the infection rate. The three curves correspond to
three different levels of initial conformism. Low initial conformism
yields good results in terms of the outbreak size, especially at large
infection rates (c = 0.1). The results are even better for moderate
initial conformism, although the improvement is modest (c = 0.5).
If initial conformism is high, however, the outbreak size mono-
tonically increases with the infection rate, and the disease may
spread through much of the population (c = 0.9). Here, the mem-
ory length is relatively long at m = 8.
nation cycles.
For the epidemic simulation, we used the stan-
dard Markovian Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR)
algorithm.[30] This is the canonical model of diseases that
make people immune upon recovery. It has nominally
two parameters—the infection rate β and the recov-
ery rate ν. However, ν only sets the time scale of the
outbreak, and since we are only interested in the final
outbreak size, we can set ν = 1 without loss of generality.
We simulate this model with a fast “event-driven algo-
rithm” as described in Kiss et al.[30] and implemented at
github.com/pholme/sir.
When the individuals evaluate their performance, they
assume a cost cV per vaccination and a cost cI for getting in-
fected. For an approved vaccine, we can assume cV < cI. Ac-
cordingly, a vaccinated individual receives the payoff Πi =
−cV per vaccination cycle, whereas someone who is not vac-
cinated gets the payoff Πi = −cII (i ), where I (i ) is the frac-
tion of outbreak simulations when i got infected. We set
cV = 0.1 and cI = 1 throughout our study.
For underlying interaction topology, we mostly use
Erdo˝s–Rényi random graphs with N = 64 nodes and equally
many edges. We try other, larger, sizes as well, but these give
qualitatively similar results. Since this paper will not con-
cern the large-size limit, to cut computation times, we stick
with the smaller systems.
We will primarily explore three parameters in our
simulations—c, m, and β and average the simulations de-
scribed above over 103 simulation runs. We use the OACIS
framework[31] to manage our simulations.
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FIG. 4. Updating of imitation
mechanisms often leads to disease-
curbing, moderate levels of con-
formism, but only if memory is
long enough. We show heatmaps
of the outbreak size ((a) and (b))
and the fraction of conformists ((c)
and (d)) as a function of the infec-
tion rate and initial conformism.
When the infection rate is low, the
outbreak size is independent of
the initial conformism, which is
evident from the horizontal contour
curves for β / 0.5 in the panels
(a) and (b). As the infection rate
increases, however, high initial con-
formism causes severe outbreaks.
Short memory fails to improve the
situation because the level of con-
formism changes little compared to
initial conformism, which is seen in
the almost vertical contour curves
in (c). Long memory, by contrast,
often improves the situation by
adjusting initial conformism to
disease-curbing, moderate levels
between 40–60 %, as seen in panel
(d). Every point is averaged over the
last 50 vaccination cycles.
FIG. 5. Long memory is better than short. The figure shows the
average outbreak size as a function of the infection rate. The three
curves correspond to three different memory lengths. The out-
break size for infection rates β ' 0.5 gets progressively smaller as
the memory length increases. Here, initial conformism is moder-
ate at c = 0.5.
III. RESULTS
Time evolution. In Fig. 1, we show a representative sim-
ulation run of the model. We find that the outbreak size
cannot be reduced by having a large initial fraction of con-
formists, irrespective of the memory length (Fig. 1, yellow
curves in (a) and (b)). Conversely, if the initial presence
of conformists is moderate, the outbreak size is greatly re-
duced (Fig. 1, blue curves in (a) and (b)). Short memory
turns out to have almost no effect on the choice of imita-
tion mechanisms, causing the population to end with a sim-
ilar fraction of conformists as in the initial state (Fig. 1(c)).
Increasing memory changes the situation. In this case, the
updating of imitation mechanisms increases, allowing the
population to converge to a fraction of conformists notice-
ably different than in the initial state (Fig. 1(d)). The popu-
lation is even able to eliminate outbreaks in the case when
the initial fraction of conformists is moderate (Fig. 1, blue
curve in panel (b)). We confirm that the selected simula-
tion run is indeed representative by averaging across a large
number of runs (Fig. 2), which exhibit the same qualitative
characteristics as the described single run.
Initial conformism. To further clarify the role of initial
conformism, we inspect how the outbreak size depends on
the infection rate for various values of the parameter c when
memory is relatively long (Fig. 3). At low infection rates,
β / 0.5, the outbreak size is independent of initial con-
formism. After that, for β ' 0.5, the results diverge. High
initial conformism precipitates massive outbreaks, whereas
moderate (0.4< c < 0.6) and low initial conformism prevent
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FIG. 6. The level of conformism
evolves only if memory is long
enough and initial conformism is
not moderate. In panels (a) and
(b), we show heatmaps of the out-
break size. In panels (c) and (d),
we show the fraction of conformists
as the functions of the infection
rate and the memory length. As
before, when the infection rate is
low, the outbreak size is indepen-
dent of the memory length, which
can be seen by the horizontal con-
tour curves for β/ 0.5 in (a) and (b).
As the infection rate increases, how-
ever, short memory precipitates se-
vere outbreaks under non-moderate
(a), but not under moderate initial
conformism (b). The reason for this
is seen in (c) in which short memory,
m < 3, fails to substantially change
the level of conformism, whereas
long memory, m > 4, drives con-
formism to moderate levels between
40–60 % (for β ' 0.5). Panel (d)
shows that a population starting
with moderate initial conformism
also ends with similar conformism
levels between 40–60 %, irrespective
of the parameters β and m.
them. Interestingly, the outbreak size is smallest when ini-
tial conformism hovers around moderate levels of c.
A detailed examination of the phase space reveals that
a population of individuals who dynamically interchange
imitation mechanisms, as envisioned in our model, often
evolves to moderate levels of conformism, but only if mem-
ory is long enough (Fig. 4). The outbreak size is thus reduced
in populations with longer memory relative to those with
shorter memory, for all infection rates β ' 0.5 and irrespec-
tive of initial conformism (Fig. 4(a) and (b)). The reason for
this reduction is that individuals who keep a shorter track of
the past tend to stick to a single imitation mechanism, im-
peding the evolution of conformism towards moderate lev-
els that help curb the disease (Fig. 4(c)). Conversely, indi-
viduals who keep a longer track of the past see their popula-
tion evolve towards the disease-curbing, moderate levels of
conformism between 40–60 % over a wide area of the phase
space, that is, for β' 0.5 and 0.10/ c / 0.85 (Fig. 4(d)).
Memory length. Our results so far have suggested that
memory length plays a vital role in shaping the fate of dis-
ease outbreaks. We now inspect this role in further detail.
In particular, looking at how the population performs as the
memory length increases, we find that long memory is bet-
ter than short, even in situations when initial conformism is
in the disease-curbing, moderate range (Fig. 5). The effect is
even more pronounced when initial conformism is outside
of the moderate range (Fig. 6(a)), the reason being that long
memory, characterised by m > 4, entices a substantial dy-
namical interchange of imitation rules when the infection
rate is sufficiently large (β ' 0.5), thus driving the level of
conformism to evolve to moderate values between 40–60 %
(Fig. 6(c)). Short memory, characterised by m < 3, cannot
achieve the same as initial conformism is largely preserved
throughout simulation runs (Fig. 6(c)). That moderate con-
formism indeed curbs the disease effectively is revealed by
simulation runs for c = 0.5 because in this case, the outbreak
size (Fig. 6(b)) is always small, while the final level of con-
formism is still between 40–60 % (Fig. 6(d)), independent of
the infection rate and the memory length.
Network structure. To confirm that the described re-
sults are robust to the choice of network structure, we have
run additional simulations on two-dimensional square lat-
tices and scale-free networks. Interestingly, only the former
structure exhibits any noteworthy differences compared to
the Erdo˝s-Rényi networks. Our previous observation that
a longer memory length reduces the outbreak size as the
infection rate increases is valid for all networks structures
(Fig. 7(a) and (b)). The square lattice quantitatively dif-
fers from the Erdo˝s-Rényi network in that the former has a
much larger diameter which, for a given infection rate, im-
pedes disease outbreaks. This, in turn, somewhat weakens
the effect of long memory on suppressing diseases. Indeed,
a longer memory always leads to more vaccination cover-
age, but such coverage is much smaller in the lattice than in
the Erdo˝s-Rényi network when infection rates are relatively
large (Fig. 7(c) and (d)). Individuals thus have an easier time
learning the best course of action to combat epidemics in
tighter, more compact networks.
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FIG. 7. Network structure quantita-
tively impacts the results, but gen-
eral conclusions stand. In panels
(a) and (b), we display the outbreak
size and in panels (c) and (d) the
vaccination coverage as functions of
the rate of infection for two differ-
ent network structures. Panels (a)
and (c) pertain to the square lattice
with a periodic boundary, whereas
panels (b) and (d) pertain to the
Erdo˝s–Rényi network of the average
degree k = 2. Our observation that a
longer memory length decreases the
outbreak size as the rate of infection
increases is valid irrespective of the
network structure. Quantitative dif-
ferences between networks arise be-
cause the lattice has a large diam-
eter that impedes outbreaks given
the same infection rate. Initial con-
formism is c = 0.50. The number of
nodes is N = 64.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have constructed a model of vaccination—based in
equal proportions on game theory, network epidemiology,
and models of social influence—in which individuals in ad-
dition to deciding whether to vaccinate or not, also have
the option to choose a preferred imitation mechanism. In-
dividuals called conformists thus rely on a simple heuristic
by which they imitate the behaviour of the neighbourhood
majority. Performists, by contrast, imitate neighbours that
perform the best in terms of payoff. The results show that
the dynamic interchange of these imitation mechanisms
suppresses disease outbreaks through better vaccination.
Two notable phenomena are that (i) too much initial con-
formism in the population and (ii) short memory of indi-
viduals are obstructive for the vaccination coverage.
The reason why too much conformism leads to a low
vaccination coverage is that too many individuals imitate
what they see in their neighbourhoods, and they mostly
see defection. This, in turn, is because our simulations
start with the initial vaccination coverage of 10 %, which
is a valid starting point from the perspective of novel vac-
cine acceptance. Such an angle is relevant at the time
of writing. On the one hand, we are amidst a pandemic
(COVID-19) for which vaccines seem like the best hope for
a solution.[2–4] On the other hand, recent years have seen
a trend of increasing vaccine hesitancy.[10, 20, 32] This trend
could partly be explained by the kind of mix of rational
thinking and predisposition to following the crowd as is
manifested by the conformists.[11, 33] However, probably it
would be more appropriate to extend our model to include
zealots—individuals who do not let the dynamics of the
game to affect their choices.[14, 18]
The other notable phenomenon revealed by our model,
specifically, that more extended memory helps boost the
vaccination coverage, is suggestive in the sense that edu-
cational measures could be used to bolster the collective
awareness of the role of vaccines in controlling infectious
diseases.[19] Classrooms are an ideal setting to raise aware-
ness about the burden of infectious diseases as well as the
success of vaccines in limiting these.[1, 34]
Finally, we note that in our simulations, the individuals
learn strategies to make the vaccination choice. This means
they are manifesting “wisdom of crowds”[35]—i.e., that pop-
ulations can perform distributed computation tasks, inte-
grating information without central control.
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